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Legal options and limits for 
the establishment of a 
European Unemployment Benefits Scheme
Introduction 
 Rationale of EUBS
 Models of EUBS
– Genuine EUBS
– Equivalent EUBS
 Basic features that distinguish the various EUBS models
– Presence of a trigger for payment
– Recipient of payment
 Relationship between EUBS and NUBS
Rationale of EUBS
 Cushioning of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks
– Smoothing out shocks is traditionally the role for fiscal policy and 
Unemployment Benefits Schemes
• At which level is the responsibility the best allocated? Member State/EA/EU?
– In a Currency Union, macroeconomic shocks cannot be compensated 
by nominal devaluation but only by real devaluation
• Prices and wages have to decrease (but are inflexible downwards)
• in order to avoid harmful short-term damages, there has to be cushioning of 
exceptional expenses (e.g. short-term unemployment benefits)
 Promoting social cohesion
Basic features of EUBS I
 Equivalent EUBS are to be distinguished from genuine EUBS 
– (1) by the presence of a trigger
• No trigger for genuine EUBS
– Main objetive: insuring a social risk / social cohesion
• Short-term unemployment rate exceeds a threshold: equivalent EUBS
– Main objective : (macroeconomic) stabilisation in times of economic crisis
– (2) by the recipient of the payment
• Genuine EUBS: Sum paid to the NUBS for subsequent payment to the 
unemployed person in accordance with EUBS law
• Equivalent EUBS: Lump sum paid to the national general budget
– Important element: Question of earmarking the lump sum for the use by NUBS
Basic features of EUBS II
 Relationship between EUBS and NUBS
− EUBS and NUBS co-exist in the territory of the MS
− NUBS pays out the benefit
− National benefit is defined by NUBS
− EU benefit is defined by the EUBS
− EU legal act provides for a conflict rule to regulate cases of overlap of NUBS and EUBS
− In case of an overlap, EUBS takes precedence over NUBS
− In case NUBS is more ‘generous’ than EUBS, NUBS remains applicable (because of a 
lack of ‘conflict’ between EUBS and NUBS)
− Outside the scope of EUBS there is no legal obligation for NUBS to adapt the 
conditions for the national benefit to the ones defined by the EUBS
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Separate legal acts are required if the respective legal bases cannot be combined with each other.
Payment side
EUBS legal act 1: Payment side
 Legal base
21(3) 48 121(6) 122(2) 148 153(2)(b) 175(3) 352(1)
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 Genuine EUBS   () ()    
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Applicable to all unemployed () ()      
Beyond reinforcing multilateral
surveillance   ()  ()   
Automatised application    () ()   
Autonomous fund  ()   () ()  
Respect of constitutional saving 
clauses with regard to social security 
(no possibility to outvote a MS)
 () () ()   () 
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EUBS legal act 1: Payment side
 Legal base for genuine EUBS
 Article 175(3) TFEU
– Specific action is to be understood broadly (CJEU, C-166/07, Parliament v Council)
– EUBS has to strengthen social cohesion
• (1) EUBS has to promote an overall harmonious development (point of reference is the entire EU 
and not only single Member States)
• (2) EUBS has to reduce social disparities between different regions and groups within the EU 
that are politically and socially intolerable
– Weakness of Article 175(3) TFEU: No undermining of limitations in other legal bases
• Right of Member States to define fundamental principles of its social security systems 
(Article 153(4), first indent TFEU)
• Unanimous voting within Council when social security law matters are affected 
(Article 21(3) TFEU, Article 153(2)(3) TFEU)
EUBS legal act 1: Payment side
 Can weaknesses in specific legal bases be compensated by 
additionally relying on Article 352(1) TFEU?
– As regards Article 175(3) TFEU: Yes.
• Unanimous voting when social security law matters are affected: Article 352(1) 
TFEU requires unanimous voting in the Council
• MS right to define fundamental principles
– Principle: Article 352(1) TFEU may not circumvent constitutional saving clauses (cf. Monti II)
– But: No prohibition to legislate in ‘questions involving any sort of link’ to the matters 
covered by the constitutional saving clause
– Here: EUBS co-existing with NUBS does not require legal adaptation of NUBS but will only 
lead to de-facto pressure to harmonise, which can be rejected by MS
EUBS legal act 1 & 2: Payment side & Minimum requirements
 Issue of Article 125(1) TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause)
– EUBS is covered
• Article 125(1) TFEU: General principle that EU does not finance MS
• EU may only transfer funding to MS if there is an explicit legal base
• Otherwise, Article 125(1) TFEU sets the limits for any other transfer
– CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle
– ‘Article 125(1) TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] provided that the conditions 
attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement sound budgetary policies’
• Applies to EUBS as it is to be based (additionally) on Article 352(1) TFEU
– EUBS must set incentives for continuous reforms of labour markets
• Experience rating and claw-back mechanisms
• Supplementing legal act setting minimum requirements for activation policies 
based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU
Financing side
EUBS legal act 3: Financing side
 Two ways of designing the financing side
– (1)  Within the EU budget
• Earmarking revenue for the exclusive use of EUBS 
( External assigned revenue, Article 21(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 966/2012)
• External assigned revenue is excluded from MFF ceilings
• External assigned revenue is considered to be ‘other revenue’ in terms of Article 311 TFEU 
( no change of Own Resources Decision)
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU
– (2)  Dedicated fund outside EU budget
• Establishment of a EUBS agency with an own distinct budget
• Control by budgetary authorities (EP/Council) comparable to EU budget law in order not to 
circumvent institutional balance
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU or international agreements
EUBS legal act 3: Financing side
 Specific feature of genuine EUBS: Raising contributions from individuals
– Discussion whether the EU has the power to raise contributions from individuals
– Precedent: Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
– Solution
• Establishment of a EUBS fund by EU regulation/IGA
• Intergovenmental Agreement (IGA) for levying and transfer of contributions by national 
authorities (following the model of the IGA for the SRF)
The economic effects
Economic effects
 Impact of EUBS variants on GDP  Impact of EUBS variants on 
Employment
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The issue of the ‘Nettozahler’: The cumulative net contributions in 
% of GDP between 1995 and 2013
Equivalent EUBS systems Geniune EUBS systems
Sources: EU-LFS and calculations by ZEW based on EUROMOD
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